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Abstract 
We empirically investigate the dynamic nature of three alternative hypotheses on the foreign 
exchange rate between the Japanese yen and US dollar in a multivariate context, using data 
from April 1985 to October 2014. The three hypotheses are the uncovered interest rate parity 
hypothesis, the current account hypothesis, and the quasi purchasing power parity hypothesis. 
Each hypothesis has significant influence on the yen–dollar exchange rate. Furthermore, it 
takes two to three years for the yield spread between the yen and dollar to have its largest 
impact on the exchange rate. In addition, the effects of unexpected shocks to the exchange rate 
on the export price ratio and current account are long lasting. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese economy has been disrupted frequently, and sometimes damaged severely, by 
fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, following adoption of a floating exchange rate system in 
1971. It is important, therefore, to understand the properties of foreign exchange rates and 
make use of this knowledge in policy making. In this paper, we examine the dynamic nature of 
the yen–dollar exchange rate over the last 30 years. In particular, we address a simple question. 
What determines the nominal yen–dollar exchange? 
There are three prominent alternative hypotheses on exchange rate determination: (1) the 
uncovered interest rate parity hypothesis (UIP), (2) the current account hypothesis (CA), and 
(3) the purchasing power parity hypothesis (PPP). Although there is extensive literature on 
these hypotheses, most studies examined the validity of each hypothesis, ignoring the other 
competing hypotheses. Omitting other relevant variables introduces bias in estimation, and 
leads to inconsistent estimates. The present paper incorporates all three hypotheses into our 
model simultaneously, and therefore avoids this type of criticism. 
The reason all relevant variables should be incorporated into a model when making policy 
decisions is illustrated by the following example. On December 14, 2010, Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun featured an article by one of the present authors, arguing that bold expansionary 
monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve was the cause of the rapid and extreme 
appreciation of the Japanese yen relative to the US dollar.1 He also suggested that the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) should conduct bold expansionary monetary policy to soften the impact of 
financial shocks by the Federal Reserve on Japan’s real economy. Figure 1 was used as 
evidence, where the data point in the middle of the figure is for October 2008, the data points to 
1Hamada et al. (2010, pp. 34–38) report that it was the late Mr. Okada Yasushi at the Cabinet Office at that time 
who first produced the three comparative charts on the size of central banks’ balance sheets, real effective 
exchange rates, and industrial production for Japan, the US, the euro area, and the UK. 
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the northeast are prior to October 2008, and those to the southwest are posterior to October 
2008.2 Figure 1 shows a clear positive correlation between the base money ratio and the 
exchange rate. The correlation between the base money ratio and the foreign exchange rate is 
commonly known among investors as the “Soros Chart (SC).” 
The day after the publication of this article, the author received an email from a BOJ 
economist, including five other charts using different sample periods, along with Figure 1, to 
show that there was little correlation between the yen–dollar exchange rate and the base money 
ratio. 
In general, Figure 1 is not sufficient to prove a causal relationship from the base money 
ratio to the exchange rate; first, because it only shows a correlation, and second, because other 
relevant variables exist that may affect both the base money ratio and the exchange rate. 
Despite this counterargument, we still argue that the sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen in 
Figure 1 is the result of bold expansionary monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve. The 
action undertaken by the Federal Reserve at that time was so extreme in magnitude that it 
dominated all other relevant variables. In other time periods, other variables have affected the 
exchange rate, which is the reason we do not observe the correlation in the other five charts. 
The bold action by the Federal Reserve after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was a kind of 
“natural experiment.” To substantiate our arguments above, we employ a vector autoregression 
(VAR) to control for other relevant variables in the determination of the yen–dollar exchange 
rate. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
2 Recall that Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September 2008. 
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Furthermore, we empirically demonstrate that it takes two to three years for monetary 
policy shocks to have their largest impact on the yen–dollar exchange rate. At first, this result is 
surprising because there is an arbitrage relationship between the exchange rate and interest rate 
differential between yen and dollars. We might expect that the exchange rate would respond 
most significantly immediately after a monetary policy shock. However, this is not the case. 
We will explain why in Section 6. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain the three alternative 
hypotheses of exchange rate determination. In Section 3, we present our baseline monthly 
model. To complement our baseline model, Section 4 estimates the corresponding quarterly 
model with a lag length of one year to examine the effects of longer lags on the exchange rate. 
In Section 5, we check the stability of the parameters of our models. Section 6 discusses some 
policy implications of our estimates. Section 7 summarizes our findings and the limitations of 
our study. 
 
2 THREE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we discuss the three alternative hypotheses of exchange rate determination, 
namely, UIP, CA, and PPP. We also explain SC, a variant of UIP. 
 
2.1 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Hypothesis 
There are two distinct kinds of behavior related to UIP, the behavior of market investors and 
that of central banks. 
 
2.1.1 Behavior of Market Investors 
In the short run, arbitrage operates between Japanese and US government bonds. Investors in 
bond markets seek profits by changing portfolio allocation, and in equilibrium, the following 
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arbitrage relationship should hold: r∗ − r ≈ 1 − �𝑒𝑒∗
𝑒𝑒
�, (1) 
where r, r∗ , e, and e∗  denote returns from Japanese government bonds, returns from US 
government bonds, the foreign exchange rate, and the expected foreign exchange rate at the 
end of the period, respectively. This hypothesis is known as UIP. The symbol ≈ indicates 
“nearly equal.” Arbitrage is the main force affecting the exchange rate. Many studies have 
tested whether UIP holds (see, for example, Ito (2005)). As this is an arbitrage relationship, 
causality operates both ways between the exchange rate e, the expected exchange rate e∗, and 
the yield spread between US and Japanese government bonds, r∗ − r. 
 
2.1.2 Behavior of Central Banks 
The injection of base money lowers the interest rate in the two-asset model, as in the textbook 
IS–LM model. In slightly more complicated models with more than two assets, it is easy to 
show that the injection of base money lowers the value of the domestic currency. The economic 
reason for this conclusion is that the domestic currency and a foreign currency are imperfect 
substitutes in the portfolio choices of capital investors, and the additional supply of the 
domestic currency lowers its value relative to a foreign currency. 
In normal economic conditions with positive short-term interest rates, central banks control 
the short-term interest rate. Lowering (raising) the short-term interest rate is equivalent to an 
injection (retraction) of base money to financial markets by the central bank. Hence, the 
Federal Reserve and BOJ have the power to influence the return on US and Japanese 
government bonds, r∗ and r. When the Japanese and US monetary authorities affect r∗ − r on 
the left-hand side of equation (1), this should also affect the current exchange rate e on the 
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right-hand side.3 
As for monetary policy effects, causality only operates in one direction. Changes in 
monetary policy in the US or Japan affect the foreign exchange rate, but not vice versa. 
However, if the monetary authorities should react to changes in the foreign exchange rate, 
causality in the opposite direction may occur. 
 
2.2 Current Account Hypothesis 
Trade imbalances were one of the central economic issues between Japan and US in the 1980s. 
The resulting huge surpluses in Japan’s current account increased the supply of US dollars in 
the foreign exchange market, and lowered the value of the US dollar relative to the Japanese 
yen. This is known as the CA hypothesis. 
Honda(p.6, 1995) plots the yen-dollar exchange rate on the vertical axis against the 
Japanese current account (measured in dollars) on the horizontal axis to find both a trend 
(toward an appreciation of the yen) and cycles around the trend at least up until early 1990s. In 
terms of the cycles, increases in Japan’s current account surplus appear to lead to appreciations 
of the yen relative to dollars. 
 
2.3 Purchasing Power Parity Hypothesis 
PPP argues that arbitrage occurs with the prices of goods and services, and that purchasing 
power across currencies should be the same. In symbols, P = P∗e, (2) 
3 Changes in r*-r on the left-hand side of equation (1) might also affect the expected exchange rate e*on the 
right-hand side. However, reliable data on e* is not available in reality, and we did not include a proxy for e*in our 
empirical models. Should there be reliable data for e* available, its inclusion into our models would certainly be 
desirable. 
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where P and P* denote the Japanese and US general price levels, respectively. 
UIP results from arbitrage behavior among portfolio investors in bond and capital markets. 
PPP, on the other hand, results from arbitrage purchasing behavior by people in terms of 
tradable goods and service. People purchase goods and services in the country where these 
goods and services are cheaper. In equilibrium, the prices of these tradable goods and services 
should be the same across the two countries under certain conditions. The effects of arbitrage 
behavior on tradable goods and services will be transmitted eventually to the prices of 
nontradable goods and services as well, and thus equation (2) should hold in the long run. 
Again, many papers examine this hypothesis (see, for example, Royal Swedish Academy of 
Sciences (2003), and Hayashi (2000)). 
In this paper, we are interested mainly in the behavior of the yen–dollar exchange rate. That 
is, we are interested in which factors affect the foreign exchange rate most. We expect that 
arbitrage is stronger for export prices than for general prices in equation (2). Hence, we use 
export price indexes for P and P* instead of general price indexes. This is why we refer to the 
hypothesis here as the quasi purchasing power parity (quasi PPP) hypothesis instead of PPP. 
 
2.4 The Soros Chart 
The well-known investor, George Soros, is said to have taken advantage of the correlation 
between base money ratios and exchange rates in his portfolio decisions; the chart showing this 
correlation is now known among investors as the “Soros Chart.” 
SC can be considered a variant of UIP. Under normal economic conditions with positive 
short-term interest rates, changes in base money can be considered equivalent to changes in 
short-term interest rates. This equivalence, however, does not hold with zero short-term interest 
rates. Yet even under the condition of zero short-term interest rates, investors still have a choice 
between intermediate- and long-term Japanese bonds and the US counterpart. Then, in 
 6 
equilibrium, arbitrage might still operate in the intermediate- to long-term bond markets. This 
is one possible explanation of SC. 
An alternative possible explanation for SC is that the quantity of base money represents the 
monetary policy stance of central banks. In this interpretation, the base money ratio indicates 
the respective monetary policy stances of the Federal Reserve and/or the BOJ. An increase in 
base money by the Federal Reserve (or the BOJ), for example, leads to an increase in money 
stock in the US (or Japan) through money creation process, as time goes by, which in turn 
decreases the value of US dollars (or Japanese yen) in the future. This line of expectations 
should change the current exchange rate now toward the depreciation of the US dollar (or 
Japanese yen). Note that causality operates in one direction under this interpretation from the 
base money ratio to the exchange rate. 
 
3 SIX-VARIABLE MODELS IN THE SHORT RUN 
In this section, we use structural vector autoregressions (VAR) as our short-run baseline 
monthly model. The model consists of six variables: Y′ = (cpi, iip, epr, ca, spread, e), (3) 
where cpi, iip, epr, ca, spread, and e denote respectively: consumer price index; index of 
industrial production; export price ratio, or the ratio of the Japanese export price index to that 
of the US; Japanese current account measured in Japanese yen; yield spread between US and 
Japanese 2-year government bonds; and the yen–dollar exchange rate (measured as yen per 
dollar). All variables are in levels.4 We include variables cpi and iip in our baseline model to 
control for the effects of the macroeconomy. Our sample covers the period from April 1985 to 
4 Regarding using variables in levels, Hamilton (1994, p. 652) notes: “(1) The parameters that describe the 
system’s dynamics are estimated consistently. (2) Even if the true model is a VAR in differences, certain functions 
of the parameters and hypothesis tests based on a VAR in levels have the same asymptotic distribution as would 
estimates based on differenced data. (3) A Bayesian motivation can be given for the usual t or F distributions for 
test statistics even when the classical asymptotic theory for these statistics is nonstandard.” 
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October 2014, and the number of observations is 355. We use Schwarz’s Bayesian Information 
Criterion (SBIC) to choose a lag length of three months in the VAR. To identify the structural 
parameters, we employ a recursive structural model with a Cholesky decomposition. We order 
those variables with stronger exogeneity first, following the suggestion of Sims(1980), as can 
be seen in equation (3). We use a one standard deviation shock of each variable in the impulse 
response analysis. 
Considering SC as a variant of UIP, we replace the yield spread variable with the base 
money ratio (bmr hereafter; the ratio of Japanese base money to US base money) in equation 
(3) when we examine the validity of SC. Next, we report the estimated results for the baseline 
monthly model, and the case of SC. 
 
3.1 Responses of the Yen–Dollar Exchange Rate 
Figure 2 shows the impulse response estimates of the yen–dollar exchange rate to various 
shocks. The solid lines indicate the point estimates, and the bands are the 95% confidence 
intervals, which are calculated using a bootstrap simulation with 400 repetitions. The 
horizontal axis measures months after a given shock. 
Panel (1,3) in Figure 2 suggests that a positive shock to Japanese export prices, given US 
export prices, reduces the supply of US dollars in the foreign exchange market. This in turn 
increases the value of the US dollars, and the yen depreciates. Panel (2,1) in Figure 2 shows 
that a positive shock to the current account appreciates the yen relative to the dollar 
significantly. Panel (2,2) in Figure 2 shows that a positive shock to the yield spread, r∗ − r, (for 
example, a more expansionary monetary policy by the Federal Reserve, relative to that by the 
BOJ), appreciates the yen relative to the dollar at the 5% significance level. The peak of the 
impact turns out to occur 20 months after the initial shock. We discuss this point in Section 6 in 
more detail. 
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 [Figure 2 around here] 
 
Table 1 shows the corresponding results of Granger causality tests on the yen–dollar 
exchange rate. The export price ratio (epr), current account (ca), and yield spread (spread) are 
all found to Granger-cause the yen–dollar exchange rate at the 1% level. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
We also examine the variance decompositions of the effects of the abovementioned three 
variables on the yen–dollar exchange rate and find similar results. Therefore, the impulse 
response functions, variance decompositions, and Granger causality tests all indicate that the 
export price ratio, current account, and yield spread all have significant impacts on the yen–
dollar exchange rate. 
 
3.2 Impacts of the Yen–Dollar Exchange Rate 
We examine the effects in the opposite direction, and report the possible impacts of changes in 
the yen–dollar exchange rate on export price ratio, current account, and yield spread. 
Figure 3 reports the responses of the above three variables to a positive shock (or 
depreciation) in the yen–dollar exchange rate. Figure 3(1) indicates that a positive shock in the 
yen relative to the dollar leads to a reduction in Japanese export prices relative to US export 
prices. As shown, the impacts are significant but with long time lags. This dynamic effect from 
a yen depreciation to a reduction in export prices, and thus to increases in exports with some 
time delay, is known as the “J curve” effect. 
Figure 3(2) shows that a positive shock in the yen relative to the dollar has little effect on 
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the current account. However, the lag length of our baseline monthly model is only three 
months. We suspect that a three-month lag length might be too short to capture the full impact 
of a change in the exchange rate on the current account. In Section 4, we report different results 
from a modified model with longer lag lengths. 
Figure 3(3) indicates a yen depreciation (appreciation) shock leads to a decrease (an 
increase) in the yield spread. This dynamic pattern might reflect Japanese government 
intervention in the foreign exchange market in the past to curb the sharp appreciation of the yen 
relative to the dollar (see, for example, Takagi (2015)). 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
Granger causality tests of the relationships in Figure 3 are reported in Table 2. These results 
support the impulse response analysis in Figure 3, and confirm the validity of the above 
interpretation. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
In summary, the exchange rate has significant impacts on the export price ratio and yield 
spread, but not on the current account in our baseline monthly model. However, the finding for 
the current account may be due to misspecification of the lag length; we examine this 
possibility in Section 4. 
 
 
3.3 The Soros Chart 
Figure 4(1) shows that a positive shock to Japanese base money relative to US base money 
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leads to a depreciation of the yen at the 5% significance level. Figure 4(2) shows the impulse 
response estimates for the base money ratio to a positive shock in the yen–dollar exchange rate. 
One possible reason for the result in Figure 4(2) is that the Japanese government has intervened 
in the foreign exchange market in the past, and purchased US dollars to curb the sharp 
appreciation of yen. However, the significance of these effects can be questioned because the 
confidence bands cover the entire horizontal axis. 
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
Table 3 shows the results of Granger causality tests corresponding to Figure 4. Taken 
together, Table 3 and Figure 4 suggest that the base money ratio affects the yen–dollar 
exchange rate, but not vice versa. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
Furthermore, comparing the effects of the yield spread on the exchange rate in panel (2,2) 
of Figure 2 and the counterpart for the base money ratio in Figure 4(1), we find that the former 
is clearly significant at the 5% level, while the latter is only marginally significant. This might 
suggest that the arbitrage relationship between the exchange rate and yield spread is stronger 
than that between the exchange rate and base money ratio. 
 
3.4 Robustness 
Our results in the above are robust to changes in the order of variables. We tried more than ten 
cases of different order of variables to find little change in our impulse response estimates. 
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4 QUARTERLY MODELS WITH ONE-YEAR LAGS 
As with the J curve effect, it might take a long time for some shocks to have their full impact. 
To deal with this issue, we report the estimated results of another model with longer lag 
lengths. More specifically, we consider quarterly models, using the same sample period. In this 
case, the SBIC suggests using three lags. However, the estimates from models with three lags 
are very similar to those from models with four lags covering 12 months. If we put one-year 
lagged variables on the right-hand side, we expect these lagged variables to control any 
seasonality effects. Consequently, we report here the estimation results from a model with lags 
covering 12 months. As for the control variables, we replace cpi and iip in the monthly models 
with GDP deflator (def) and real GDP (rgdp) in the quarterly models, respectively. 
 
4.1 The Quarterly Model Corresponding to the Baseline Monthly Model 
Figure 5 shows the impulse response estimates of the yen–dollar exchange rate to various 
shocks. Figure 6 depicts the impulse responses of the export price ratio, current account, and 
yield spread to a depreciation shock in the yen–dollar exchange rate. The measure on the 
horizontal axis in Figures 5, 6, and 7 is quarters after a given shock. Tables 4 and 5 report the 
results of the Granger causality tests, corresponding to Figures 5 and 6. 
 
[Figures 5 and 6 around here] 
[Tables 4 and 5 around here] 
 
Comparing these with the corresponding results from the baseline monthly model, we 
observe the following three points. First, overall, the results in the quarterly model are very 
similar to those in the baseline monthly model. Second, although we find that the yen–dollar 
exchange rate does not Granger-cause the current account in our baseline monthly model in 
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Table 2 (p-value of variable ca is 0.542), the yen–dollar exchange rate does Granger-cause the 
current account at the 10% significance level in our quarterly model in Table 5 (p-value of 
variable ca is 0.088). We also observe similar results from the impulse response analyses. That 
is, the time periods in which the confidence bands do not contain the horizontal line in our 
quarterly model in panel (2,1) of Figure 5 are much longer than the counterparts in our baseline 
monthly model in panel (2,1) of Figure 2. The main difference between the baseline monthly 
model and the quarterly model is that the former has a three-month lag length, while the latter 
has a 12-month lag length. These findings suggest that changes in the exchange rate affect the 
current account, but with a longer lag. Third, it takes as long as almost three years for the yield 
spread to have its largest impact on the yen–dollar exchange rate in our quarterly model in 
panel (2,2) of Figure 5. The corresponding time period in our baseline monthly model in panel 
(2,2) of Figure 2 is almost two years. Thus, we conclude that it takes two to three years for the 
yield spread to have its largest impact on the exchange rate. 
 
4.2 The Soros Chart in the Quarterly Model 
Figure 7(1) reports the impulse responses of the yen–dollar exchange rate to a positive shock in 
the base money ratio in the quarterly model. Figure 7(1) indicates that an increase in the 
Japanese base money relative to the US leads to a depreciation of the yen at the 5% significance 
level. The peak of the impact is about two years after the shock. Although the estimates of the 
impact are only marginally significant in the baseline monthly model in Figure 4(1), they are 
clearly significant at the 5% level in the quarterly model with longer time lags in Figure 7(1). 
 
[Figure 7 around here] 
 
Figure 7(2) shows the impulse responses of the base money ratio to a depreciation shock in 
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the exchange rate in the quarterly model. The estimates are not significant at the 5% level. 
Table 6 shows the results of the Granger causality tests corresponding to Figure 7. These results 
together with Figure 7 suggest that the base money ratio affects the yen–dollar exchange rate, 
but not vice versa. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
5 POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN PARAMETERS 
We now examine the possibility that the parameters in our VAR might have changed over the 
sample period. To check this possibility, we add another variable to each one, including the 
intercepts, in the right-hand side of our VAR system. The added variable is the original one 
multiplied by a dummy variable, which has  a value of zero before a possible structural change 
period and one after that. Under the null hypothesis of no structural change in parameters, the 
coefficients of all added variables are zero. Under the alternative hypothesis, at least one of the 
coefficients are nonzero. We calculate the likelihood ratio test statistics, and repeat the same 
procedure at different points in time. The results are presented in Figure 8, where time is 
measured on the horizontal axis and the values of the test statistics are given on the vertical 
axis. Figure 8 indicates that the parameters are most likely to have changed just after March 
1989. Hence, we reconducted the above analysis for our baseline monthly model using data 
only for the period from April 1989 onward. However, there was little difference in our 
estimates from the baseline monthly model with 355 observations and the model with the 
smaller sample of 307 observations. 
 
[Figure 8 around here] 
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If we confine ourselves to the more recent years in Figure 8, we find that the test statistic is 
highest just after January 2006. Again, we reconducted the above analysis using our baseline 
monthly model, using data only from February 2006 onward. We found that the point estimates 
from the smaller sample had the same qualitative properties as those from our baseline monthly 
model, but that the confidence bands were much wider using the smaller samples. Therefore, 
we found less statistical significance for all variables, including the export price ratio, current 
account, and yield spread with the smaller samples of 105 observations. 
 
6 SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Next, we discuss our empirical results from the viewpoint of monetary policy. 
 
6.1 UIP and Monetary Policy 
It is important to distinguish between two kinds of effects when short-term interest rates (or 
base money ratio in the case of SC) change. One is the effects of portfolio behavior by market 
investors in financial markets. These effects are immediate, as arbitrage occurs immediately. 
Here, we call these “portfolio effects.” 
The second type of effects is caused by the interaction between financial variables and 
macroeconomic variables. We call these interactive effects of monetary policy 
“macroeconomic effects.” It usually takes a few years for monetary policy shocks to be 
transmitted to the real sector and to have their full impact on the macroeconomy. 
When the monetary authorities change their short-term interest rate (or the quantity of base 
money in the case of SC), the exchange rate reacts to this shock immediately (the first type of 
effects). However, the impulse response results in Figures 2, 5, and 7 suggest that the effects on 
the exchange rate are long lasting, and that it takes two to three years for the effects of the 
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impact to reach their peak.5 Why does it take so long? 
Our interpretation is as follows. When a new monetary policy shock occurs, it usually takes 
a few years for the shock to have its full impact on the money supply through money creation 
process. The money supply balances of yen relative to dollars are in turn the dominant 
determinants of the yen–dollar exchange rate. Therefore, it takes two to three years for a new 
policy shock to have its full impact on the exchange rate. 
 
6.2 Effects of an Exogenous Yen–Dollar Exchange Rate Shock 
An exogenous unexpected shock to the foreign exchange rate (for example, an exogenous 
change in the US money supply) has long-lasting effects on the export price ratio, current 
account, and yield spread, as indicated by the impulse response results in Figures 3 and 6. In 
particular, the impact of a shock to the yen–dollar exchange rate on the export price ratio lasts 
more than five years, and on the current account almost permanently, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We summarize our findings and discuss the limitations of the present paper. There are four 
main points. First, our empirical analyses support each of the three alternative hypotheses, UIP, 
CA, and quasi PPP. Second, changes in the yen–dollar exchange rate have long-lasting impacts 
on export prices and the current account, lasting more than five years. Third, monetary policy 
has its largest impact on the exchange rate with a lag of two to three years. As for the Soros 
Chart, we observe causality from the base money ratio to the yen–dollar exchange rate, but not 
vice versa. 
In this paper, we concentrated our analysis on the main determinants of the yen–dollar 
5 This empirical result is robust to changes in the maturities of bonds. We tried bonds with maturities of two, three, 
and five years and found virtually the same results. 
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exchange rate and on the impacts of changes in the exchange rate. To control for the effects to 
and from the real sector, we incorporated cpi and iip in our baseline monthly model, and GDP 
deflator and real GDP in our quarterly model, respectively, for the sake of simplicity. However, 
to analyze fully the interaction between the exchange rate and the real sector, we need a more 
elaborate specification for the real sector. This is beyond the scope of the current paper, and 
remains for future research. 
  
 17 
DATA APPENDIX 
 
Variable Description Source 
cpi Consumer price index (all items) 
2010 average = 100 
Statistics Japan 
iip Index of industrial production (original index) 
2010 average = 100 
Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry 
epr Ratio of Japanese export price index (yen basis, all 
commodities) to that of the US (all commodities), 
both standardized at 1990 
Bank of Japan 
U.S. Department of Labor 
ca Current account (net balance) Ministry of Finance Japan 
spread Yield spread between US Treasury securities and 
Japanese government bonds (monthly average) 
Ministry of Finance Japan 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
e US dollar/yen spot rate at 17:00 in JST (average in 
the month, Tokyo market) 
Bank of Japan 
bmr Ratio of Japanese base money (average amounts 
outstanding) to US base money (total) 
Bank of Japan 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
def GDP deflator (original series, 2005 = 100) Cabinet Office 
rgdp Real GDP (original series, 2005 = 100) Cabinet Office 
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FIG. 2. Impulse Responses for the Yen–Dollar Exchange Rate in the Baseline Monthly Model 
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FIG. 3. Impulse Responses for Yield Spread, Current Account, and Export Price Ratio to a Positive Shock 
(Depreciation) in the Yen–Dollar Exchange Rate in the Baseline Monthly Model 
 
  
 28 
FIG. 4. Impulse Response Estimates for the Soros Chart in the Baseline Monthly Model 
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FIG. 5. Impulse Response Estimates for the Yen–Dollar Exchange Rate to Shocks in Export Price Ratio, Current 
Account, and Yield Spread in the Quarterly Model 
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FIG. 6. Impulse Response Estimates for Export Price Ratio, Current Account, and Yield Spread to a Depreciation 
Shock in the Yen–Dollar Exchange Rate in the Quarterly Model 
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FIG. 7. Impulse Response Estimates for the Soros Chart in the Quarterly Model 
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FIG. 8. Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics for Possible Structural Breaks 
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